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INTRODUCTION 
Autism is one of the most hotly debated disorders listed in the current Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual (DSM), eliciting passionate and often conflicting opinions among health 
professionals, medical practitioners, parents and researchers. Despite moving on from the 
early and notorious 'refrigerator mother' pathogenic theories (where autism was said to be 
caused by emotionally distant parents) to more modem epigenetic conceptualisations (where 
autism is viewed as being caused by an interaction between a genetic susceptibility and an 
environmental trigger), surprisingly little has changed in regards to autism as a diagnostic 
construct. The exclusive use of a triad of behavioural indicators (impaired social interaction 
and communication, and restricted and repetitive behaviour) to diagnose autism appears to be 
increasingly out of step with contemporary research into 'biomarkers' or biomedical aspects 
of the condition. An understanding of the tensions and conflicts surrounding autism is critical 
in order to fully appreciate the conservative nature of information provided in the DSM. This 
chapter will touch on some of the controversies as they apply to the inclusion of autism in the 
DSM, ultimately, leading us to consider the most controversial question of all: Does autism 
belong in the DSM at all? 
AUTISM AS A PSYCHIATRIC DISORDER: THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
To understand how autism is conceptualised in the DSM, it is important to understand a 
little of the history of the men who provided the first comprehensive clinical descriptions of 
autism (Leo Kanner) and Asperger's disorder (Hans Asperger), and whose clinical opinions 
and biases continue to have an influence on our current understanding of Autism Spectrum 
Disorder. 
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Kanner, a psychiatrist and physician, first proposed the discovery of a new condition, 
which would later become known as autism (or classical autism), in his seminal paper of 1943 
(Kanner, 1943). His paper, which would fail to meet the standards of most oftoday's leading 
scientific journals, is a 19,000 word detailed case series analysis of 11 children. The cases are 
presented in a narrative form with almost no references to medical examinations or 
evaluations and, instead, a relentless description of child and parental behavioural 
characteristics is provided, with Kanner repeatedly attempting to draw behavioural/ 
psychological parallels between the child and parents: "This much is certain, that there is a 
great deal of obsessiveness in the family background. (Kanner, 1943, p. 250)" In this 
perspective lies the genesis of the refrigerator mother theory of autism, whereby, autism was 
presumed for several decades to be caused by what was termed, emotionally 'frigid' mothers; 
that is, mothers who were considered to be devoid of any warmth or affection towards their 
child. Although the theory is attributed to another psychiatrist (Bruno Bettelheim), the 
refrigerator mother theory was clearly supported by Kanner who in a 1960 interview 
described parents of autistic children as "just happening to defrost long enough to produce a 
child" (Time, 1988). Incredibly, not one word of this lengthy paper is devoted to the 
consideration of any alternative explanations for the "fascinating peculiarities" Kanner 
observed, nor does Kanner provide evidence that a single medical hypothesis was 
investigated. It is also noteworthy that Kanner's apparent bias towards conceptualizing autism 
as a psychiatric anomaly resulting from a deficient relationship between mother and child, 
rather than a medical, physical or neurological condition was reflected in his journal of 
choice, "Nervous child". 
Austrian-born, Kanner was influenced by the dominant psychiatric paradigm of the time; 
psychoanalysis. Hence, his personal perspective appeared to be brought to bear on the 
original 11 children; "We must, then, assume that these children have come into the world 
with innate inability to form the usual, biologically provided affective contact with people, 
just as other children come into the world with innate physical or intellectual handicaps. 
(Kanner, 1943, p. 250)" In other words, Kanner assumed that the children were abnormal 
from birth. Not only is this curiously incongruent with his support of the refrigerator mother 
theory (which posits the exposure to the causal trigger as occurring after birth), but there is no 
indication that any medical examination or differential diagnostic process was undertaken to 
rule out other plausible explanations for the behaviours observed in these children. 
Furthermore, Kanner was not able to personally observe any of the autistic children from 
birth as he commenced contact with the children from the ages of 4 and above. 
In a startling coincidence, only a year later, Hans Asperger, another Austrian-born 
psychiatrist and paediatrician, published the first definition of Asperger's syndrome in 1944 
(Asperger, 1944). In a paper describing just 4 young boys, he identified a pattern of behaviour 
and abilities that he called "autistic psychopathy." His special interest was "psychically 
abnormal" children. In this, we see that Asperger reveals his bias to be similar to that of 
Kanner's in that Asperger's disorder was viewed as an impairment in the child's ability to 
relate to, or interact with the outside world. Unlike Kanner, Asperger does not speculate as to 
the cause of this impairment, however, his conclusions were based purely on observation, 
failing to carry out any medical testing or differential diagnosis to rule out known conditions 
of the time. So, the names Kanner and Asperger are inextricably linked to the autism 
spectrum. Several important questions remain however: How likely is it that these two men 
discovered, by chance, a brand new psychiatric disorder never before seen in the human 
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species, which appeared simultaneously on separate continents at around the same time? And 
what does it suggest that both men were Austrian-born and heavily influenced by the 
psychoanalytic perspective of behaviour and human development, both failed to undertake 
testing of physiological variables or attempt medical explanations for the behaviour they were 
seeing, and both published articles of their discovery as a new psychiatric disorder? 
AUTISM IN THE DSM 
Modem perspectives of autism continue to be influenced by Kanner and Asperger. This 
point is most clearly exemplified by the evolution of autism in the DSM. Autism first 
appeared in the third edition of the DSM as "Infantile Autism" in a new class of conditions 
titled "Pervasive Developmental Disorders" almost four decades after it was first identified 
(American Psychiatric Association [APA], 1980). At this time autism was considered to be an 
unusually early form of schizophrenia caused by maternal deprivation (the refrigerator mother 
theory) and other psychogenic causes, and it was Rutter (1978), who was widely attributed for 
operationalising Kanner's narratives into the definition of autism published in the DSM-III. 
This also marks the introduction of the 'triad of impairments' or 'triad of autistic behaviours' 
now considered synonymous with autism, whereby a diagnosis of autism is made if a child 
demonstrates gross deficiencies in social interaction and language development (relative to 
their age), and displays bizarre and/or repetitive behaviours. 
Substantial revisions were made in the DSM-III-R, with the criteria broadened to reflect a 
developmental orientation and the heterogeneity of autism (APA, 1987). The DSM-III-R 
criteria comprised of 16 items, eight of which must be present, with a minimum of two items 
from social interaction, one from communication and one from repertoire of activities and 
interests required for a diagnosis to be made. The age of onset was also increased by 6 months 
(from 30 to 36 months of age). Subsequent editions of the DSM, both the fourth edition and 
the text revision of the fourth edition, have largely retained the same definition (AP A, 1994, 
2000). In the DSM-IV-TR, the number of items was reduced with a minimum of six of 12 
items required to be present for a diagnosis to be made. 
Interestingly, while Asperger's disorder was described around the same time as autism, it 
was not included in the DSM until the fourth edition (and continued in the text revision of this 
edition) (AP A, 1994, 2000). As with autism, the disorder is contextualised as a 
behavioural/developmental condition, the primary difference to autism being that there is 
comparatively less disability with only two of the three categories critical to a diagnosis of 
autism (social interaction deficits and restricted repertoire of interests and activities) required 
to be present. 
Two substantial changes have been proposed for the DSM-V, scheduled for publication 
in 2013. The first proposed change recommends collapsing two of the three diagnostic 
domains, communication and social interaction, into one. The second proposed change 
recommends the introduction of a new disorder category 'Autism Spectrum Disorder', which 
will supersede current identifiers including autistic disorder, Asperger's disorder, childhood 
disintegrative disorder, and pervasive developmental disorder- not otherwise specified. As 
can clearly be seen, the DSM-IV-TR criteria, including the criteria proposed for the DSM-V, 
continue to place autism in a developmental/behavioural context. And as an interesting 
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footnote (and point of reflection) to this condition's history, Asperger's status as an 'official' 
and distinct psychiatric disorder will have lasted just one primary edition of DSM (4th 
edition). 
COMPETING FRAMEWORKS 
With regard to thinking critically about autism and the DSM, the most fundamental 
question is whether it should be included in the publication at all. The answer to this question 
is deeply connected to the aetiology of autism, which remains elusive and contentious. To 
illustrate, let's consider an alternative framework that has come to prominence in the past 
decade: autism as a biomedical condition. 
This framework proposes that autism develops from the combination of an individual 
(perhaps genetic) susceptibility and exposure to an environmental insult at a critical time 
point, either in utero or early infancy (Bernard et al., 2001). Promising research implicates 
heavy metals, mercury in particular, as the environmental trigger. For example, behavioural 
changes, hyperactivity and alterations in spontaneous and learned behaviours have been 
observed in animals exposed to mercury during the prenatal or early postnatal period (Agency 
for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, 1999) and this response to mercury exposure has 
been noted in the Japanese prefectures of Kumamoto and Niigata where mercury poisoning 
outbreaks (Minamata disease and Niigata Minamata disease) occurred in the 1950s and 60s 
(Masazumi, 1972). In comparison to controls, significant elevations of mercury in the urine of 
children with autism has been reported as well as elevations in urinary markers of mercury 
damage (Austin and Shandley, 2008; Bradstreet, Geier, Kartzinel, Adams and Geier, 2003; 
Geier and Geier, 2007; Nataf, Skorupka, Amet, Lam, Springbett and Lathe, 2006). Other 
studies have found the severity of autism to positively correlate with the child's body burden 
of toxic metals (Adams et al., 2009; Geier et al., 2009; Holmes, Blaxill and Haley, 2003). 
Additionally, some epidemiological studies have found an association between mercury 
exposure and ASD prevalence (e.g., Gallagher and Goodman, 2009; Geier and Geier, 2006; 
Palmer, Blanchard, Stein, Mandell and Miller, 2006; Palmer, Blanchard and Wood, 2009; 
Windham, Zhang, Gunier, Croen and Grether, 2006), but not all (e.g., Hviid, Stellfeld, 
Wohlfahrt and Melbye, 2003). Recent research provides further support for this framework 
showing the prevalence of autism to be 8-fold higher than the general population among the 
offspring of a population known to have an idiosyncratic sensitivity to mercury (Shandley and 
Austin, under review). 
A further argument in considering the manner in which autism appears in the DSM 
relates to the range of biological irregularities consistently found in individuals diagnosed 
with autism. These irregularities include (but are not limited to): elevated oxidative stress 
(James et al., 2004; Kern and Jones, 2006), mitochondrial-respiratory disorders (Oliveira et 
al., 2007; Rossignol and Bradstreet, 2008), generalized inflammation (Zimmerman et al., 
2005), neuroinflammation (Herbert, 2005; Pardo, Vargas, Zimmerman, 2005), gastrointestinal 
abnormalities (Horvath and Perman, 2002; Parracho, Bingham, Gibson and McCartney, 
2005), and fatty acid deficiencies (Amminger et al., 2007; Vancassel et al., 2001). While the 
DSM includes a small paragraph on associated laboratory findings, only abnormalities in 
serotonin and brain activity are mentioned. In fairness, it should be noted that much of the 
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research identifying biomedical irregularities in autism was conducted in the years subsequent 
to the release of the DSM-IV-TR. Nevertheless, if autism is, in fact, an organic biomedical 
condition , it is worth pondering what affect its classification as a mental disorder in the DSM 
has had on how we research and treat this condition and, more importantly, the impact this 
has had on the tens of millions of children who have suffered this condition and their families. 
Looking to the future, what research, and/or political process within the AP A and the 
international scientific community would be required before autism was fundamentally 
changed within the DSM (to reflect a biomedical conceptualization and etiology), or delisted 
altogether? 
MENTAL DISORDERS VERSUS MEDICAL CONDITIONS 
Ironically, while the purpose of the DSM is to present a classification of mental or 
psychiatric disorders, the authors acknowledge that "no definition adequately specifies 
precise boundaries for the concept of 'mental disorder'." Although the DSM committee have 
attempted to create a clear working definition of mental disorder (see: Stein et al., 2010), the 
point of pathologising behaviour is still somewhat arbitrary. Furthermore, the authors of the 
DSM contend that there is a false dichotomy between distinguishing a disorder as either 
'mental' or 'physical' in nature. That is, that no condition is solely of the mind or body, 
therefore, no such dichotomy between the two domains exist (Kendell, 2001). Yet, in reality, 
by the very nature of the publication, this is precisely what the authors of the DSM have set 
out to do, create a classification system that separates disorders from mind from those of the 
body. While this is certainly reasonable, the mind and the body are well-established as inter-
and independent functioning parts. The question is, without a concrete operational definition 
of a mental disorder, where do we draw the line, and has the line been drawn in the correct 
places for all DSM disorders? 
Consider the case of Alzheimer's disease. Alzheimer's is commonly considered a 
neurodegenerative disease with associate psychiatric symptoms including loss of memory and 
cognitive ability plus agitation, mood disturbance and marked personality change. 
Nevertheless, Alzheimer's is considered a medical condition and therefore does not appear in 
the DSM as a mental disorder except to have its psychiatric features noted as part of the 
general category of dementia. 
This is an important distinction as it provides a marker to the health professions that 
Alzheimer's should primarily be the responsibility and interest of medical practitioners and 
researchers. By contrast, conditions in the DSM are held to be the primary responsibility and 
interest of psychiatrists and psychologists. 
So, if we get the categorisation of a condition wrong, we potentially facilitate a mis-fit 
between condition and health professional. For example, if autism is indeed better categorised 
in the DSM as Alzheimer's is (i.e., as an organic medical condition with concomitant 
behavioural/cognitive deficits), then for over 70 years since autism was first identified, 
essentially the wrong health professionals (psychologists and psychiatrists) have been on the 
case. 
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MORE CONTROVERSY? 
There is another perspective radically at odds to those covered thus far that is important 
to consider if one is to have a broad understanding of autism and its relationship to the DSM. 
Above, we have discussed the possibility that autism may not appropriately belong in the 
DSM based on the possibility that it is an organic biomedical condition (like, for example, 
Alzheimer's disease), yet there are those who suggest a radically different rationale for the 
deletion of autism from the DSM; the notion of "neurodiversity". The neurodiversity 
movement has its roots in autism (and is often led by individuals with a diagnosis of high 
functioning autism or Asperger's disorder themselves), but in recent years has spread to other 
conditions in the DSM (e.g., Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and schizophrenia). 
These individuals propose that autism is not a disorder of any type and, in fact, the behaviours 
associated with autism are just natural variants that need not be pathologised. Their argument 
is often paralleled to that ofhomosexuality whereby a constellation ofbehaviours summarised 
as homosexuality was originally pathologised through DSM criteria, but was de-pathologised 
in 1973 through its delisting from the DSM-II. Proponents of a neurodiversity perspective 
argue that people exhibiting autistic behaviours are merely different to the norm (like 
homosexuals) but that this fact does not justify it being pathologised. 
It is an intensely passionate debate, but tellingly, it is not one that is able to be undertaken 
by any individual with moderate to severe autism who is unable to speak, work, maintain 
significant relationships, feed or look after themselves. Such individuals require lifelong high 
intensity care. This latter point is of critical consideration when making a determination as to 
whether or not a behaviour is pathological. This is where the analogy to homosexuality breaks 
down as homosexuality does not lead to the kind of severe and global dysfunction that is 
often the case with autism. 
ALL DIAGNOSES ARE NOT CREATED EQUAL 
Another issue to be cognisant of is the difference between a substantive diagnosis and 
merely a syndrome. Cancer is a substantive diagnosis because it directly speaks to the 
mechanistic driving dysfunction (i.e., the abnormal growth of cells proliferating in an 
uncontrolled way and, in some cases, metastasising). Autism, on the other hand, is not a 
substantive diagnosis and merely represents a summary word for the triad of behaviours that 
identify the condition. 
To put this in perspective, consider the tautology whereby someone might say, "Oh, that 
boy doesn't speak and behaves strangely because he has autism." This is a tautology because 
to not speak and act strangely is autism. For example, consider Sudden Infant Death 
Syndrome (SIDS), the label given to the sudden and unexpected death of a baby with no 
known illness. We may hear that a particular baby died of SIDS. This is a tautology as SIDS 
is not a disease state. The baby died not of SIDS, but of an undetermined cause. SIDS is 
merely a summary term used for this phenomenon. To reiterate, it is important when thinking 
critically about the DSM and autism not to be lulled into an unfounded sense of certaipty as to 
precisely what it is that we are dealing with. Analogous to SIDS, children who have language 
and behavioural problems do not act that way because they have autism, they act that way for 
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reasons we simply do not yet understand. Autism is merely a summary word for the triad of 
impairments, not the cause of them. 
The DSM does not claim to provide a historical and/or exhaustive account of all variables 
considered relevant to a disorder listed within its pages. Nor is its focus one of divining the 
cause of a disorder, but, this issue (whether the APA choose to address it or not) remains 
pivotal to the fundamental issue of what a disorder is, and therefore, whether or not it is 
appropriately classified as psychiatric in nature. The cause of a condition is instrumental in 
determining whether it is classified as a mental disorder, medical condition or medical 
condition with psychological/psychiatric features. This is of critical concern as it is important 
to understand that the DSM contributes to an internally reinforcing model whereby, because 
autism is conceptualized as a behavioural or developmental disorder, research and field trials 
that follow are designed to examine variables of that nature almost exclusively, thus 
confirming the original assumptions and in tum informing the next version of the DSM 
(Volkmar et al., 1994). In other words, if we define autism as being represented by a specific 
set of behaviours, then design studies to see if those behaviours exist in a certain population 
we have already identified as demonstrating those behaviours (and unsurprisingly find that 
they are), we conclude that autism exists and is validly indicated by the original criteria: An 
internally reinforcing model. 
CONCLUSION 
Autism as a diagnostic entity has changed very little since it was first identified in 1943. 
This is at least partially attributable to Kanner and the manner in which he conceptualized 
autism as a parentally-mediated psychopathology. Understanding the origins of autism, or any 
disorder for that matter, is crucial, as once a disease state is defined and labelled, the way in 
which it is perceived, treated and researched is not easily altered. 
• The DSM serves an important purpose to both medical and health professionals, but 
it is not without its drawbacks and should not be taken as representing absolute truth. 
Some key points to consider when critically examining its content include, but are by 
no means limited to the following: Who discovered the disorder? What personal 
biases might they have brought to bear on the disorder through their education, 
training and/or culture? 
• The DSM claims to be a scientifically-based publication, but is it the science that 
drives the inclusion of a disorder within the manual or is it cultural, historical, and/or 
political factors. 
• What nature of investigation has been undertaken on the disorder? Is the research 
narrow in focus only considering limited areas without any consideration or regard 
for others? 
• Many conditions have both a medical and psychological/psychiatric component. 
How has it been determined in which category the condition belongs? Consider how 
rigorously the disorder was examined before its inclusion in the DSM. Was a 
thorough medical examination and differential diagnosis process undertaken to rule 
out other explanations? 
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• If a disorder is linked to a range of biomedical problems at what point should it stop 
being considered a mental disorder? 
• If someone with autism says, "Stop trying to cure me, I'm fine." what should our 
response be? 
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